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CRITIQUE AND COMMENT 
‘STORYLINE PATENTS’: ARE PLOTS PATENTABLE? 
BEN MCENIERY* 
[The most interesting questions that arise in patent law are the ones that test the boundaries of 
patentable subject matter. One of those questions has been put forward recently in the United States 
in an argument in favour of patenting the plots of fictional stories. United States attorney Andrew F 
Knight has claimed that storylines are patentable subject matter and should be recognised as such. 
What he claims is patentable is not the copyrightable expression of a written story or even a written 
outline of a plot but the underlying plot of a story itself. The commercial application of ‘storyline 
patents’, as he describes them, is said to be their exclusive use in books and movies. This article 
analyses the claims made and argues that storylines are not patentable subject matter under 
Australian law. It also contends that policy considerations, as well as the very nature of creative 
works, weigh against recognition of ‘storyline patents’.] 
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I   TH E  PR O P O S E D  ‘STO RY L I N E  PAT E N T’ 
In 2003, Andrew F Knight submitted the first of several patent applications to 
the United States Patent and Trademark Office claiming patent protection in 
respect of a number of fictional story plots or, to use his term, ‘storylines’.1 His 
 
 * BA, LLB (Hons) (UQ), LLM (QUT); Lecturer, Faculty of Law, Queensland University of 
Technology; admitted to practice as a solicitor before the High Court of Australia and the Su-
preme Court of Queensland. Email <b.mceniery@qut.edu.au>. 
 1 Andrew F Knight, ‘A Patently Novel Plot: Fiction, Information, and Patents in the 21st Century’ 
(2006) 47 IDEA 203, 204. Knight cites four applications, each of which is entitled ‘Process of 
Relaying a Story Having a Unique Plot’: US Patent Application 20050244804 (filed 28 Novem-
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theory is that storylines are patentable subject matter and should be recognised as 
such.2 
According to Knight, a storyline is an invention.3 A ‘storyline patent’ would 
provide monopoly protection over the useful application of the underlying plot of 
a fictional story that is both ‘novel’ and ‘non-obvious’.4 What is claimed is not 
the copyrightable expression in material form of a written story or even the 
copyrightable expression of a written outline of a plot, but a method of relaying 
the underlying plot of a story itself.5 Knight makes method claims for both plot 
alone — in the form of ‘the process necessary to implement the unique fictional 
plot in an entertainment medium’6 — and for plot embedded in a physical 
medium:7 
A storyline is an invention that may be embodied in a useful, functional method 
for relaying that storyline, or in a tangible medium containing that storyline. 
Patent protection for storyline methods or storyline articles of manufacture is 
the next logical legal step in furtherance of the stated aims of patent law.8 
Knight argues that there is insufficient intellectual property protection for 
writers who develop new and unique story plots. He contends that an intellectual 
property regime that allows an author to retell another writer’s tale pays insuffi-
cient regard to the ‘spark of ingenuity’9 and ‘flash of inspiration’10 that gives rise 
to innovative storylines and that the patent system should reward creators of 
storylines in the same way that it currently rewards inventors of new technolo-
gies.11 In support of his argument, Knight cites Hollywood movies recycling 
what he describes as ‘hackneyed plots’ as evidence of a need for economic 
rewards for ‘inventors’ of new plots.12 
Knight’s argument in favour of the patentability of storylines is based upon 
analogy. He draws analogies between inventions that are clearly patentable and 
storylines, and then asks why a creative and new storyline should be treated 
differently from inventions and denied patent protection. For example, he argues 
that if computer software contained on a disk can be patentable subject matter, 
then a storyline recorded on a DVD should not be treated differently.13 
 
ber 2003); US Patent Application 20050255437 (filed 17 May 2004); US Patent Application 
20050272013 (filed 7 June 2004); US Patent Application 20050282140 (filed 17 June 2004). 
 2 See Andrew F Knight, ‘A Potentially New IP: Storyline Patents’ (2004) 86 Journal of the Patent 
and Trademark Office Society 859; Knight, ‘A Patently Novel Plot’, above n 1. 
 3 Knight, ‘A Potentially New IP’, above n 2, 873. 
 4 The requirement of ‘novelty’ is found in 35 USC § 102 and the requirement of ‘non-obviousness’ 
is found in 35 USC § 103. 
 5 Knight, ‘A Potentially New IP’, above n 2, 859. 
 6 Ibid. 
 7 Ibid 868–70. 
 8 Ibid 873 (emphasis in original). 
 9 Ibid 872. 
 10 Ibid 871–2. 
 11 Ibid 871–7. 
 12 Ibid 873. 
 13 Ibid 869. 
     
294 Melbourne University Law Review [Vol 33 
 
     
The object of storyline patents is to provide both copyright and patent protec-
tion to forms of creative literary works, in a similar fashion to the way computer 
software is amenable to both copyright and patent protection.14 A patent confers 
exclusive rights to exploit a storyline,15 and the value of a patent lies in the 
advantages that patent law holds over copyright protection. Copyright law will 
only protect the particular expression of a storyline that is in material form, not 
the underlying plot itself.16 Even then, copyright in a storyline plot would only 
be infringed where there is a taking of the storyline that amounts to copying.17 
This is the essence of the idea–expression dichotomy. For these reasons, the law 
of copyright is not broad enough to give authors of storylines the sort of intellec-
tual property protection that Knight suggests they deserve. 
Knight highlights the different treatment the law affords authors who write 
whole stories and authors whose activities are limited to creating unique and 
captivating plots: 
Currently, a writer may receive free, comprehensive, and automatic copyright 
protection on anything she writes. If her skill consists primarily of expressing 
old, stale concepts in new, creative, exciting ways, then she will benefit from 
copyright protection. However, if her skill consists primarily of inventing new 
and unique broad concepts, then copyright protection will only protect one of 
uncountably many possible expressions of those new and unique concepts.18 
Accordingly, his argument is that a remedy should be provided to authors who 
have had their plot ideas copied by another writer in a manner that does not 
involve an infringement of copyright. He contends that patent law is the appro-
priate vehicle to provide that remedy. Knight describes the benefits to a patent 
holder in the following way: 
a patent on a particular storyline method or storyline-containing article or 
manufacture would cover every embodiment of the claimed invention. Every 
possible expression of the storyline — whether involving five characters or ten, 
whether set in Amsterdam or Chicago, whether told in the first person by a Ni-
gerian heroine or in the third person by a Chinese hero, whether embodied in a 
novel, a script, a movie, an advertisement, a television program, or a radio show 
— would require infringement of the claimed method or article of manufacture. 
Again, each different expression of the underlying storyline may be independ-
ently copyrightable, but every expression would be covered by the patent. Just 
as a patent granted on a software method or software-containing medium effec-
tively covers the underlying software itself, so a patent granted on a storyline 
 
 14 In Australia, a ‘computer program’ is protected by copyright law by virtue of it being a ‘literary 
work’; a ‘computer program’ includes both object code and source code: Copyright Act 1968 
(Cth) ss 10(1), 21(5), 31. In addition, a patent may be awarded in respect of a computer software 
program when the requirements for patentability in the Patents Act 1990 (Cth) have been satis-
fied: see below n 103. 
 15 Patents Act 1990 (Cth) s 13. 
 16 Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) s 31(1). 
 17 Copyright protection guards against the reproduction of a work in material form, but it does not 
prevent independent creation: Powerflex Services Pty Ltd v Data Access Corporation [No 2] 
(1997) 75 FCR 108, 126 (Black CJ, Hill and Sundberg JJ). 
 18 Knight, ‘A Potentially New IP’, above n 2, 874, citing US Patent Application 20050244804 
(filed 28 November 2003). 
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method or storyline-containing article of manufacture effectively covers the un-
derlying storyline itself.19 
A storyline patent would therefore be infringed when reproduced in any way. 
Knight notes that the proposed storyline patents are of broad scope, so that: 
A director infringes it at least when she makes a movie implementing the im-
plicitly claimed storyline (and possibly at other times, such as a showing of the 
movie); an actor infringes it at least when he plays his part as the first charac-
ter; an owner of a movie theater infringes it at least when he shows the movie; 
the consumer infringes it at least when she plays a DVD containing the movie; 
and so forth.20 
An example of the sort of protection Knight argues for was that sought by, but 
not afforded to, Leon Arden in the case of Arden v Columbia Pictures Indus-
tries Inc.21 Arden brought a claim for infringement of copyright in his published 
novel, One Fine Day,22 which involved a man living through the same day over 
and over.23 Arden alleged that the essential elements of his novel, including ‘the 
plot, mood, characters, pace, setting, and sequence of events’,24 were copied and 
appeared in the film Groundhog Day.25 Although Chin DJ acknowledged that the 
novel and the film were based on the same idea, he held that the idea had been 
expressed differently in the novel and the film and that the similarities between 
the works related only to ‘ideas, concepts, or abstractions.’26 Chin DJ’s opinion 
further noted that as ‘copyright law only protects the expression of ideas, rather 
than ideas themselves … the idea of a repeating day, even if first conceived by 
[the] plaintiff,’ does not fall within the scope of copyright protection.27 
Many of Knight’s motivations are set out on his website.28 The most prominent 
motivation appears to be taking advantage of the most lucrative means of 
exploiting a storyline patent — the creation of a unique movie plot.29 On his 
website, Knight identifies several movie plots that he believes would potentially 
have been patentable prior to their public release, namely: Memento (which 
Knight uses as a working example), The Thirteenth Floor, Being John Malk-
ovich, The Butterfly Effect, The Game, Fight Club, The Matrix, Total Recall, The 
Truman Show, Minority Report, The Village, Groundhog Day, and Eternal 
Sunshine of the Spotless Mind.30 
 
 19 Knight, ‘A Potentially New IP’, above n 2, 870 (emphasis in original). 
 20 Ibid 868. 
 21 908 F Supp 1248 (SDNY, 1995). This example was used in Anu R Sawkar, ‘Are Storylines 
Patentable? Testing the Boundaries of Patentable Subject Matter’ (2008) 76 Fordham Law Re-
view 3001. 
 22 Leon Arden, One Fine Day (1981). 
 23 Arden v Colombia Pictures Industries Inc, 908 F Supp 1248, 1249 (Chin DJ) (SDNY, 1995). 
 24 Ibid. 
 25 Directed by Harold Ramis, Columbia Pictures, 1993. 
 26 Arden v Columbia Pictures Industries Inc, 908 F Supp 1248, 1249–50 (SDNY, 1995). 
 27 Ibid 1259. 
 28 See Knight and Associates, Storyline Patents and Plot Patents (2004) <http://www. 
plotpatents.com>. 
 29 Knight and Associates, Applications (2004) <http://www.plotpatents.com/applications.htm>. 
 30 Ibid. 
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Given the relatively recent expansion of patent protection into the realms of 
computer programming and business methods,31 it is not surprising that someone 
would seek to further stretch the bounds of patent law to encompass fields within 
the ‘fine arts’ such as literature, the performing arts and entertainment. These 
attempts to patent plot go far beyond the devices of mechanical, industrial and 
business utility, which are currently accepted as patentable subject matter. They 
would pose a serious threat to our cultural advancement if successful. 
At first blush it appears that storylines are not the type of innovation that 
patent law is designed to reward nor appropriate subject matter for the grant of 
the monopoly rights that attach to a patent. Instead, it appears that this subject 
matter should remain solely within the domain of copyright, even if that means 
only limited, and possibly ineffective, protection is available. The consequence 
of this is that if an alleged infringer ‘steals’ a plot idea but does not infringe 
copyright in doing so, they will not have done something the law considers to be 
a wrong.32 
Storyline patents are compelling not only due to their potential to erode the 
public domain, integral to the creation of new literature, but also because they 
represent a new wave of innovative challenges to the patent system. They seek to 
manipulate the patent system’s connection to its historical roots in supporting 
new ‘manufactures’, which traditionally provided an incentive for the creation of 
new industrial devices and methods.33 
The object of this article is to investigate whether storylines are, and whether 
they ought to be, patentable. Part II outlines Knight’s arguments in favour of the 
patentability of storylines. Part III addresses the patentability of storylines 
according to current Australian law. It concludes that there are three grounds 
upon which patents of this type would likely fail: they are not patentable subject 
matter; they either lack novelty or the requisite degree of inventiveness; and they 
lack utility as they cannot be sufficiently described so as to enable a person 
skilled in the art to reproduce the invention in order to create a useful product. 
Part IV considers the policy issues involved, finding that storyline patents would 
be contrary to the public interest. Part V concludes that the attempt to patent plot 
reveals a misunderstanding of the nature of creative works, the creative process 
and the objects of patent law. 
 
 31 See, eg, Diamond v Diehr, 450 US 175 (1981); State Street Bank & Trust Co v Signature 
Financial Group Inc, 149 F 3d 1368 (Fed Cir, 1998); AT&T Corporation v Excel Communica-
tions Inc, 172 F 3d 1352 (Fed Cir, 1999); Welcome Real-Time SA v Catuity Inc (2001) 113 FCR 
110; CCOM v Jiejing (1994) 51 FCR 260. 
 32 Powerflex Services Pty Ltd v Data Access Corporation [No 2] (1997) 75 FCR 108. 
 33 For an examination of the history and traditional objects of the patent system, see E Wyndham 
Hulme, ‘The History of the Patent System under the Prerogative and at Common Law’ (1896) 12 
Law Quarterly Review 141; E Wyndham Hulme, ‘The History of the Patent System under the 
Prerogative and at Common Law: A Sequel’ (1900) 16 Law Quarterly Review 44; E Wyndham 
Hulme, ‘On the History of Patent Law in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries’ (1902) 18 
Law Quarterly Review 280; P J Federico, ‘Origin and Early History of Patents’ (1929) 11 Journal 
of the Patent Office Society 292; Paul E Schaafsma, ‘An Economic Overview of Patents’ (1997) 
79 Journal of the Patent and Trademark Office Society 241. 
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I I   TH E  AR G U M E N T S  I N  FAV O U R  O F  STO RY L I N E  PAT E N T S 
As Knight is a patent attorney from the United States, his arguments in support 
of storylines being patentable subject matter are directed to United States law. He 
regards the legal analysis of storyline patent claims as straightforward. Knight 
focuses on the principle that patentable subject matter includes ‘anything under 
the sun that is made by man’34 other than subject matter that falls within the 
stated exceptions identified in the case law, being the ‘laws of nature, natural 
phenomena, and abstract ideas’35 that do not produce a ‘useful, concrete, and 
tangible result’.36 His argument is that storyline patent claims do not fall within 
the stated exceptions to patentable subject matter, do produce a ‘useful, concrete, 
and tangible result’ and therefore must be patentable subject matter. The fact that 
the method is one for producing entertainment, according to Knight, does not 
render it unpatentable.37 
Further, Knight asserts, relying on the Board of Patent Appeals and Interfer-
ences decision in Ex parte Lundgren,38 that patent law does not contain a 
‘technological arts’ requirement and that, accordingly, his storyline patent claims 
do not need to amount to a technological innovation in order to be patentable.39 
Finally, he says that the question of patentability does not hinge on whether an 
alleged invention is a form of entertainment or how an entertaining device or 
method entertains.40 
After asserting that storylines are patentable subject matter, Knight fails to pay 
much attention to the issues of whether a storyline method claim could pass the 
tests of ‘novelty’ and ‘non-obviousness’.41 It is of particular concern that Knight 
does not adequately respond to the argument that storylines are so plentiful and 
exhaustive that no story is really new and non-obvious. He merely says that new 
stories are analogous to new types of pumps and we see new types of pumps 
 
 34 Knight, ‘A Potentially New IP’, above n 2, 859, citing Diamond v Chakrabarty, 447 US 303, 309 
(Burger CJ for Burger CJ, Stewart, Blackmun, Rehnquist and Stevens JJ) (1980). Knight’s argu-
ment is reminiscent of Maurer’s in favour of broad scope of patentable subject matter: Erik S 
Maurer, ‘An Economic Justification for a Broad Interpretation of Patentable Subject Matter’ 
(2001) 95 Northwestern University Law Review 1057. 
 35 Knight, ‘A Potentially New IP’, above n 2, 860, citing Diamond v Diehr, 450 US 175, 185 
(Rehnquist J for Burger CJ, Stewart, White, Powell and Rehnquist JJ) (1981). 
 36 Knight, ‘A Potentially New IP’, above n 2, 862, citing State Street Bank & Trust Co v Signature 
Financial Group Inc, 149 F 3d 1368, 1375 (Rich J for Rich, Plager and Bryson JJ) (Fed Cir, 
1998), cert denied 119 S Ct 851 (1999). State Street Bank & Trust Co v Signature Financial 
Group Inc was in turn citing Re Alappat, 33 F 3d 1526, 1544 (Rich J for Rich, Pauline Newman, 
Michel, Plager, Laurie and Rader JJ) (Fed Cir, 1994). Since Knight wrote, this ten-year-old 
formula for determining patent-eligible subject matter — that an invention must produce a ‘use-
ful, concrete, and tangible result’ — has been overturned by the United States Court of Appeals 
for the Federal Circuit, which described the test as being ‘insufficient to determine whether a 
claim is patent-eligible’: Re Bilski, 545 F 3d 943, 959 (Michel CJ for Michel CJ, Lourie, Schall, 
Bryson, Gajarsa, Linn, Dyk, Prost and Moore JJ) (Fed Cir, 2008). 
 37 Knight, ‘A Potentially New IP’, above n 2, 869. 
 38 76 USPQ 2d (BNA) 1385 (Bd Pat App & Int, 2005) (designated precedential opinion). 
 39 Knight, ‘A Patently Novel Plot’, above n 1, 207–12. This argument is made only in Knight’s 
2006 article, which appears to have been written in response to criticism of his 2004 article. 
 40 Knight, ‘A Patently Novel Plot’, above n 1, 210–12. 
 41 Ibid 212. 
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evolving all the time,42 and that it must be impossible to contend that no-one in 
the world will ever conceive of a distinct plot that satisfies the tests of novelty 
and non-obviousness.43 
The plots in question are cast as method claims, which are one type of pat-
entable subject matter permitted under United States law.44 Each plot is de-
scribed as a series of steps that, if followed, is said to produce a useful result in 
the form of valuable entertainment. In addition, Knight argues that plots, when 
embodied in a particular physical medium, are patentable as articles of manufac-
ture (another type of patentable subject matter permitted under United States 
law).45 
Knight puts forward the argument that storylines are analogous to computer 
software. He says that despite the existence of the judicially-created printed 
matter doctrine, which excludes printed matter per se from patent protection on 
the basis that intellectual property protection is already afforded under copyright 
law,46 patent law protects the method that software executes on a computer. By 
analogy Knight argues that, like software, a fictional storyline should be pro-
tected as a process.47 
Knight provides an example of a claim to a method of implementing the plot 
of the film, Memento, to produce a ‘useful, concrete, and tangible result’ of 
producing valuable entertainment: 
A process of relaying a story having a unique plot, the story involving charac-
ters and having a timeline, comprising: indicating that a first character has an 
inability to retain long-term memories after a time in the timeline; indicating 
that said first character trusts notes written by said first character; indicating 
that said first character believes that said first character has been wronged by a 
perpetrator; indicating that said first character desires to perform an act of retri-
bution against said perpetrator; indicating that said first character believes that 
attempting to perform said act is a futile endeavor; and indicating that said first 
character writes a note to said first character indicating that a second character, 
whom the first character believes is not the perpetrator, is the perpetrator.48 
According to Knight, the example claim ‘seems to catch the essence of the 
movie’s underlying storyline, [and] looks and feels like … an ordinary, func-
tional, useful method.’49 Knight claims that any expression of the plot would 
 
 42 Ibid 212–13. 
 43 Ibid. 
 44 35 USC § 101 sets out what is patentable subject matter. The provision provides for four 
categories of patentable subject matter: ‘Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful proc-
ess, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement 
thereof, may obtain a patent therefore, subject to the conditions and requirements of this title.’ 
 45 Knight, ‘A Potentially New IP’, above n 2, 867. 
 46 Ibid 863–6. Knight identifies Re Gulack, 703 F 2d 1381, 1385 (Smith J for Baldwin and 
Smith JJ) (Fed Cir, 1983) and Re Lowry, 32 F 3d 1579, 1583 (Rader J for Rich J, Skelton SCJ 
and Rader J) (Fed Cir, 1994) as the judicial source of the printed matter doctrine and the United 
States Patent and Trademark Office, Manual of Patent Examining Procedure (2008) as a source 
for a related or identical doctrine. 
 47 Knight, ‘A Potentially New IP’, above n 2, 860. 
 48 Ibid 867, quoting US Patent Application 20050244804 (filed 28 November 2003). 
 49 Ibid 868. 
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infringe the storyline patent, regardless of the characters, setting or point of view 
of the teller and regardless of the medium of expression, whether it be a book, 
movie script, advertisement or television program.50 From this example, it is 
clear that copyright protection is of little use, as it would be a trivial task to 
‘invent around’ this story by taking its essential features and creating a substan-
tially different product that followed the same or a similar sequence of events. 
Knight then gives an example of what he dubs a ‘storyline article claim’, 
which is a claim to a physical article of manufacture that embodies the storyline, 
such as a DVD or video cassette that contains a visual recording of the storyline 
being played out.51 He says that this type of claim is indistinguishable from 
computer program claims to a data-recording medium that embodies functionally 
unrelated and independently patentable software.52 
I I I   TH E  PAT E N TA B I L I T Y O F  STO RY L I N E S  U N D E R  AU S T R A L I A N  LAW 
Patents in Australia have traditionally been thought to lie within the domains 
of engineering and industry, applying to the manufacture of physical and 
mechanical devices of industrial application and the application of forces upon a 
physical object to change the material state of that object.53 However, percep-
tions of the uses to which the patent system should be put changed when 
entrepreneurs in commerce and business began to seek the same patent protec-
tions for their innovations as had been awarded to engineers and industrialists. 
Given the interest in the patent system shown by entrepreneurs in commerce and 
business,54 it should come as little surprise that those in the literary arts and 
 
 50 Ibid 870. 
 51 Ibid 869. 
 52 Ibid. 
 53 See Lionel Bently and Brad Sherman, Intellectual Property Law (2001) 310: 
the image of the invention as the human intervention into nature that brings about a resulting 
physical change that underpins much contemporary jurisprudence, was well entrenched in 
British law by the mid-nineteenth century. 
  Robert P Merges, ‘As Many as Six Impossible Patents before Breakfast: Property Rights for 
Business Concepts and Patent System Reform’ (1999) 14 Berkeley Technology Law Journal 577, 
585: 
For Thomas Jefferson and his cohorts, a piece of technology was readily identifiable: it had 
substance, and moving parts, and did something out in the practical world of farming or manu-
facturing. At the very least, for Jefferson, if you put technology in a bag and shook it, it would 
make some noise. 
  Maurer, above n 34, 1057: 
When people think of patented inventions they probably think about well-tooled, oily parts 
that make machines run — something they can put their hands on, weigh with dead reckoning, 
and intuitively understand. 
 54 See United States Patent and Trademark Office, Class 705 Application Filing and Patents Issued 
Data (January 2009) <http://www.uspto.gov/web/menu/pbmethod/applicationfiling.htm>; Re 
Bilski, 545 F 3d 943, 1004 (Mayer J) (Fed Cir, 2008); Douglas L Price, ‘Assessing the Pat-
entability of Financial Services and Products’ (2004) 3 Journal of High Technology Law 141, 
153: ‘The State Street case has opened the floodgates on business method patents’; Peter H Kang 
and Kristin A Snyder, ‘A Practitioner’s Approach to Strategic Enforcement and Analysis of 
Business Method Patents in the Post-State Street Era’ (2000) 40 IDEA 267, 278; Josephine 
Chinying Lang, ‘Management of Intellectual Property Rights: Strategic Patenting’ (2001) 2(1) 
Journal of Intellectual Capital 8. 
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entertainment sectors of the economy should seek intellectual property protection 
for their creations. 
A  The Statutory Test for Patentability 
The test for determining whether an invention is patentable is found in s 18 of 
the Patents Act 1990 (Cth). Section 18 requires that, for a standard patent, an 
invention must be a ‘manner of manufacture’ within the meaning of s 6 of the 
Statute of Monopolies 1623,55 be novel and involve an inventive step, be useful, 
and not have been used in secret.56 In addition to these requirements, the opening 
words of s 18 ‘impose a threshold requirement’ that an alleged invention must 
satisfy before it need be tested against the listed heads of patentability in s 18.57 
This threshold requirement of inherent patentability stems from the requirement 
in s 18 that an ‘invention’ be disclosed on the face of a patent application.58 The 
term ‘invention’ used in s 18 is defined in sch 1 to the Act in the following way: 
invention means any manner of new manufacture the subject of letters patent 
and grant of privilege within section 6 of the Statute of Monopolies, and in-
cludes an alleged invention.59 
The threshold requirement will not be met and the patent application may be 
refused without the need to compare it with the prior art base if, on its face, it is 
apparent that the invention does not differ from existing inventions or does not 
involve an inventive element.60 
A patent applicant must disclose the invention in a patent specification. A 
complete specification must ‘describe the invention fully, including the best 
method known to the applicant of performing the invention’.61 The specification 
must disclose the invention in sufficient detail and with sufficient clarity to allow 
 
 55 21 Jac 1, c 3. 
 56 Patents Act 1990 (Cth) s 18(1). The requirements for an innovation patent are similar, but the 
requirement for an inventive step is replaced by the need for an innovative step: s 18(1A). An 
innovation patent is a second-tier patent that is intended to provide less expensive monopoly 
rights for lower level or incremental inventions for a shorter period than for a standard patent. 
Note also that the expression ‘patentable invention’ is defined in the Dictionary in sch 1 as ‘an 
invention of the kind mentioned in section 18.’ 
 57 NV Philips Gloeilampenfabrieken v Mirabella International Pty Ltd (1995) 183 CLR 655, 663–4 
(Brennan, Deane and Toohey JJ). 
 58 Ibid. At the time this case was decided the introductory words in s 18(1) read: ‘a patentable 
invention is an invention that …’. This wording has subsequently been amended by the Patents 
Amendment (Innovation Patents) Act 2000 (Cth) to state: ‘an invention is a patentable inven-
tion … if …’. It is suggested that the ‘threshold requirement’ of inventiveness remains notwith-
standing this change to the wording. 
 59 Patents Act 1990 (Cth) sch 1. 
 60 NV Philips Gloeilampenfabrieken v Mirabella International Pty Ltd (1995) 183 CLR 655, 664–6 
(Brennan, Deane and Toohey JJ). Cf Lockwood Security Products Pty Ltd v Doric Products 
Pty Ltd (2004) 217 CLR 274, 291–2 (Gleeson CJ, McHugh, Gummow, Hayne and Heydon JJ). 
See also Griffin v Isaacs (1938) 12 ALJR 169, 170, where Dixon J held that if the subject matter 
of a working invention were to be indistinguishable in merit or principle from an existing inven-
tion, it would not possess the newness or threshold inventiveness required of a manner of new 
manufacture. See generally Gum v Stevens (1923) 33 CLR 267. 
 61 Patents Act 1990 (Cth) s 40(2)(a). 
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a person skilled in the relevant art to make or carry out the invention.62 This 
requirement is intended to ensure that the scope of protection afforded by a 
patent is commensurate with the technical contribution made by the claimed 
invention. The claims and the specification define the scope of the patentee’s 
monopoly. Equally as important, this requirement also allows the specification to 
form the basis of further innovation by others. Naturally, the public is free to use 
the invention and the specifications as to how to perform it at the end of the 
patent term.63 
The exclusive rights granted to a patentee upon the grant of a patent include 
the right to exploit the invention; the exclusive rights are personal property and 
are capable of assignment and of devolution by law.64 ‘Exploit’ is further defined 
as including: 
 (a) where the invention is a product — make, hire, sell or otherwise dispose 
of the product, offer to make, sell, hire or otherwise dispose of it, use or 
import it, or keep it for the purpose of doing any of those things; or 
 (b) where the invention is a method or process — use the method or process 
or do any acts mentioned in paragraph (a) in respect of a product result-
ing from such use.65 
In fact, patents are regarded as a right to exclude others, not a right to use the 
invention (which accrues to the inventor irrespective of whether a patent is 
issued).66 
B  Patentable Subject Matter: The ‘Manner of Manufacture’ Requirement 
The head of patentability in s 18 used to determine whether an invention 
constitutes patentable subject matter is that it be a ‘manner of manufacture’. This 
test stems from s 6 of the Statute of Monopolies 1623, which declared void all 
monopolies, as they were at common law, provided that the invalidating provi-
sions of the statute: 
shall not extend to any [letters] Patents and Graunts of Privilege for the tearme 
of fowerteene yeares or under, hereafter to be made of the sole working or mak-
inge of any manner of new Manufactures within this Realme, to the true and 
first Inventor and Inventors of such Manufactures, which others at the tyme of 
makinge such [letters] Patents and Graunts shall not use, soe as alsoe they be 
not contrary to the Lawe nor mischievous to the State, by raisinge prices of 
Comodities at home, or hurt of Trade, or generallie inconvenient … 
 
 62 Samuel Taylor Pty Ltd v SA Brush Co Ltd (1950) 83 CLR 617, 623–4 (Latham CJ), 625 
(McTiernan J), 626 (Webb J); Kimberly-Clark Australia Pty Ltd v Arico Trading International 
Pty Ltd (2001) 207 CLR 1, 16–17 (Gleeson CJ, McHugh, Gummow, Hayne and Callinan JJ), 
quoting No-Fume Ltd v Frank Pitchford & Co Ltd (1935) 52 RPC 231, 243 (Romer LJ); Decor 
Corporation Pty Ltd v Dart Industries Inc (1988) 13 IPR 385, 397–9 (Sheppard J); AMP Incor-
porated v Utilux Pty Ltd (1971) 45 ALJR 123, 128 (McTiernan J); Valensi v British Radio Cor-
poration [1973] RPC 337, 376–7 (Russell, Buckley and Cairns LJJ). 
 63 CCOM Pty Ltd v Jiejing Pty Ltd (1994) 51 FCR 260, 277 (Spender, Gummow and Heerey JJ). 
 64 Patents Act 1990 (Cth) s 13. 
 65 Patents Act 1990 (Cth) sch 1. 
 66 Steers v Rogers [1893] AC 232, 235 (Lord Herschell LC). 
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The modern application of the ‘manner of manufacture’ test was explained by 
the High Court of Australia in National Research Development Corpora-
tion v Commissioner of Patents (‘NRDC’).67 It is now well settled that the 
decision and reasoning of the High Court of Australia in NRDC clarified the 
existing law in respect of what is patentable subject matter in Australia.68 
Barwick CJ in Joos v Commissioner of Patents described the case as a ‘water-
shed’.69 According to the Full Court of the Federal Court of Australia in CCOM 
Pty Ltd v Jiejing Pty Ltd, ‘the decision changed the direction of the case law not 
only in Australia but also in the United Kingdom.’70 In NRDC, the High Court 
resolved that it is not correct to attempt a literal interpretation of the words used 
in s 6 of the Statute of Monopolies. Instead it said that the question to be asked in 
determining whether an invention is a patentable subject matter is: ‘Is this a 
proper subject of letters patent according to the principles which have been 
developed for the application of s 6 of the Statute of Monopolies?’71 What the 
Court meant by this is that the principles that underlie the ‘manner of manufac-
ture’ concept are to be induced from the case law in which the concept has been 
interpreted, expounded and applied. 
According to the High Court, those principles are that an invention must be an 
artificially created state of affairs that is of economic significance, meaning that 
its value to the country must be in the field of economic endeavour, and that it 
must have an ‘industrial or commercial or trading character’.72 Further, it must 
offer some advantage that is material in the sense that it must be part of the 
‘useful arts’ rather than the ‘fine arts’.73 The Court regarded as inherently 
unpatentable: non-economic subject matter, which might include surgical 
methods; natural phenomena, which involve insufficient human involvement or 
newness to possess the artificiality required of inventions; abstract ideas or plans 
not of sufficient practical utility or application; and the use of known substances 
or devices, the utility of which was previously known, and that lack the me-
chanical inventiveness or novelty of principle required to support a ‘manner of 
new manufacture’.74 
 
 67 (1959) 102 CLR 252. 
 68 Grant v Commissioner of Patents (2006) 154 FCR 62, 64 (Heerey, Kiefel and Bennett JJ). 
 69 (1972) 126 CLR 611, 616. 
 70 (1994) 51 FCR 260, 287 (Spender, Gummow and Heerey JJ). The decision has also been 
accepted as good law and followed in New Zealand: see Swift & Co v Commissioner of Patents 
[1960] NZLR 775 (‘Swift’). The Australian and New Zealand decisions have also been consid-
ered in the United Kingdom: United Kingdom, The British Patent System: Report of the Commit-
tee to Examine the Patent System and Patent Law, Cmnd 4407 (1970) 64, where it was stated 
that ‘[w]e have no reason to suppose that the United Kingdom Courts will not in future take the 
liberal view of patentable inventions which was taken by the Australian and New Zealand Courts 
[in NRDC and Swift]’. The same conclusion was reached by the Australian Industrial Property 
Advisory Committee in its review of the Statute of Monopolies-based model of inherent pat-
entability prior to the introduction of the Patents Act 1990 (Cth): see Industrial Property Advi-
sory Committee, Patents, Innovation and Competition in Australia (1984) 39–41. 
 71 NRDC (1959) 102 CLR 252, 269 (Dixon CJ, Kitto and Windeyer JJ). 
 72 Ibid 275, citing Re Lenard’s Application (1954) 71 RPC 190, 192 (Lloyd-Jacob J). 
 73 NRDC (1959) 102 CLR 252, 275 (Dixon CJ, Kitto and Windeyer JJ), citing Re Virginia-Carolina 
Chemical Corporation’s Application [1958] RPC 35, 36 (Lloyd-Jacob J). 
 74 NRDC (1959) 102 CLR 252, 262–4, 275 (Dixon CJ, Kitto and Windeyer JJ). 
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The scope of patent protection rightly only extends to give incentives to inno-
vators to invent, or invest in the invention and commercialisation of, new 
inventions. The core issues to be resolved in determining whether storylines are 
patentable inventions are whether they fall within the useful arts rather than the 
fine arts and whether they amount to an artificially created state of affairs 
reduced to sufficient practical application, as opposed to being abstract ideas. 
1 Plots Fall within the ‘Fine Arts’ 
In Re Cooper’s Application, the Attorney-General, Sir Robert Finlay, said: 
a man could not ask for a Patent to be granted to him for a literary composition. 
That, if anything, would be the subject of copyright. In order to ask for a Patent 
a man must come forward saying that he has some invention with reference to a 
manufacture.75 
That principle, confirmed in NRDC,76 has come to represent the position of the 
fine arts in relation to patents for manufactures. 
The fine arts are normally taken to include ‘the products of human intellectual 
activity which seek expression through … [aesthetic creations such as] painting, 
sculpture [and] music.’77 Methods describing a mechanical process of creating 
art may be patentable, but an artistic output itself is not.78 The first may fall 
within the useful arts, while the second is firmly among the fine arts. Indeed, 
many useful applications in respect of art and entertainment that fall within the 
useful arts have already been patented.79 Largely, these art and entertainment 
related inventions are tools or methods to be applied mechanically to streamline 
or improve the process by which art is created. Such methods must be able to be 
performed repeatedly in a consistent fashion to achieve consistent and predicable 
results to be patentable, but need not realise identical results in the way a 
machine-press might. Variations in each finished product are acceptable if there 
is sufficient similarity between the results such that they can be said to have 
originated in the same process.80 What these inventions do not contain are claims 
 
 75 (1901) 19 RPC 53, 54. 
 76 (1959) 102 CLR 252, 275–6 (Dixon CJ, Kitto and Windeyer JJ). 
 77 Australian Patent Office, Manual of Practice and Procedures (2006) vol 2, [2.9.2.4] (‘Fine 
Arts’). 
 78 Ibid. For examples of arrangements of literary or artistic content possessing the mechanical 
inventiveness required of an invention, see Re Fishburn’s Application (1938) 57 RPC 245 (which 
involved a method of arranging a cinema ticket so that it could be torn in half either way, with all 
necessary information appearing on either half); Re Cooper’s Application (1901) 19 RPC 53 
(which involved an improved form of newspaper page featuring a blank space along which the 
page could be folded so as to avoid the trouble involved in reading over the folded part of the 
paper). 
 79 Examples of art and entertainment related inventions can be found at Internet Patent News 
Service, Patent Database, Patenting Art and Entertainment <http://www.patenting-art.com/ 
database>, which lists over 100 industrial-type applications that are used in relation to creating 
art. 
 80 Any patentable process must be repeatable. To be repeatable in this sense means that, when the 
process is performed by a person skilled in the relevant art, the result must be substantially re-
peatable or the process must substantially produce the same result each time it is performed. If 
the process does not produce substantially similar results when performed then it is not ‘useful’ 
as it will not be capable of delivering the result promised in the patent specification. There is no 
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to pure art, such as particular movies, books, stories, paintings or sculpture. 
Patent protection in these cases is given to the tools or methods used to create 
art, not, as Knight would have it, the art itself. By way of example, a product that 
is a new type of paintbrush for use by an artist would unquestionably be patent-
eligible subject matter, as might a new technique of using a paintbrush to 
increase an artist’s efficiency. But the end product, a painting, would not be 
patentable. 
Knight’s attempt to categorise fictional plots as falling within the useful arts 
rather than the fine arts is at best misleading. The essence of this argument is that 
a literary work (or to be more precise, the idea behind a literary work) falls 
within the useful arts because they could have practical applications of economic 
significance. The truth of the matter is, Knight’s patentable storylines form only 
the basis of literary works. Knight’s patent applications do not show methods or 
devices that would enable someone to better, or more efficiently or more rapidly, 
produce a story plot. Instead, they are artistic works themselves. 
2 Plots Are Merely Abstract Ideas 
Knight complains that copyright does not protect what he considers to be 
valuable innovation.81 However, his proposition that an idea insufficient to 
trigger copyright protection might somehow warrant patent protection82 is 
mistaken. 
Patents protect an idea’s reduction to practical application, rather than mere 
ideas. Further, the concept of invention requires a degree of completeness in the 
subject matter. As the High Court in NRDC has told us, patent law requires that 
there be a functional, working ‘method [that] has been put into practice’83 before 
its protection is forthcoming. Similarly, copyright protects written expression in 
material form, rather than an idea that may form the basis of a creative work. A 
story plot is, in that sense, an unfinished work. Without being reduced to a viable 
written form expressed in a manner sufficient to warrant publication, it is 
incomplete, and therefore lacking practical application. Thus, it is not an 
invention, but a mere abstract idea or a combination of abstract ideas. As such, a 
plot is deserving of neither copyright nor patent protection. The danger of 
storyline claims is that they would pre-empt subsequent use of the mere ideas 
they embody, which is an outcome patent law is designed to avoid. 
 
requirement that a process be exactly repeatable or produce exactly the same result each time it is 
performed; so long as the result achieved is consistent with the result promised by the inventor 
then the disclosure requirements will have been met and the process will be ‘useful’: Badische 
Anilin und Soda Fabrik v Levinstein (1887) 12 App Cas 710, 712 (Lord Halsbury LC); Mentor 
Corporation v Hollister Inc [1993] RPC 7; Lane-Fox v The Kensington and Knightsbridge Elec-
tric Lighting Co (Ltd) (1892) 9 RPC 413, 417–18 (Lindley LJ), 421 (Kay LJ). See also Biogen 
Inc v Medeva plc [1997] RPC 1, 26–7 (P Prescott QC); Re Swartz, 232 F 3d 862 (Fed Cir, 2000). 
 81 Knight, ‘A Potentially New IP’, above n 2, 871–3. 
 82 Ibid 873. 
 83 (1959) 102 CLR 252, 277 (Dixon CJ, Kitto and Windeyer JJ). 
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3 Plots Lack a Physical Element, Transformation or Effect 
The next question to consider is whether a storyline can be properly seen as an 
‘invention’ even though it lacks any sort of physical element. The essence of 
Knight’s claims are story plots. As a plot by itself does not have a physical 
element, it is immediately a contentious candidate for patentability. 
Some of Knight’s plot methods do not specifically claim a physical embodi-
ment, whereas others do. An example of the sort of claim that does not specifi-
cally claim a physical embodiment is the claim set out above which begins, ‘[a] 
process of relaying a story having …’.84 That is to be contrasted with claims that 
do involve a physical embodiment, an example being those that recite storylines 
embodied in tangible storage media such as CDs and DVDs, which are ‘[a] 
machine-readable storage medium storing information and configured to cause a 
machine to perform a process of relaying a story having a unique plot, the story 
involving characters and having a timeline’.85 Each claim will be considered 
separately. 
The Full Court of the Federal Court of Australia in Grant v Commissioner of 
Patents (‘Grant’) has held that an invention must disclose some physical effect 
or phenomenon to be patentable.86 Accordingly, an alleged invention that does 
not disclose some ‘physical effect in the sense of a concrete effect or phenome-
non or manifestation or transformation’ will not be regarded as being patentable 
subject matter.87 
Grant dealt with the patentability of a method created to protect an asset from 
the claims of creditors. The alleged invention involved a series of elements: first, 
the creation of a trust; secondly, a person making a gift of money to the trust; 
thirdly, the trustee lending a sum of money to that first person; and finally, the 
trustee securing the loan by taking a charge over the asset.88 The aim of the 
method is that the trustee, by virtue of having taken a charge over the asset, 
would thereby have priority over other creditors of the person in whose favour 
debts may arise at a later time.89 The patent in question (an innovation patent) 
claimed a method of applying the law. In effect, the patent involved reserving the 
ability to apply certain aspects of the law in a particular way, to achieve a useful 
result, to one individual.90 The Full Court unanimously rejected Grant’s claims 
and upheld the decision to revoke the patent.91 
It has recently been revealed that the law in the United States contains a simi-
lar requirement. There, the law now requires that a process claim satisfy the 
‘machine-or-transformation’ test created by the Court of Appeals for the Federal 
 
 84 See above n 48 and accompanying text. 
 85 Knight, ‘A Potentially New IP’, above n 2, 869. 
 86 (2006) 154 FCR 62. 
 87 Ibid 70 (Heerey, Kiefel and Bennett JJ). 
 88 Ibid 64; Australian Innovation Patent No 2003100074 (filed 7 February 2003) 2–3. 
 89 See Australian Innovation Patent No 2003100074 (filed 7 February 2003). 
 90 It was described in this way by the trial judge: Grant v Commissioner of Patents (2005) 67 IPR 
1, 2–3, 6 (Branson J). 
 91 Grant (2006) 154 FCR 62, 73 (Heerey, Kiefel and Bennet JJ). 
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Circuit in Re Bilski.92 According to that test, a process claim will be pat-
ent-eligible if ‘(1) it is tied to a particular machine or apparatus, or (2) it trans-
forms a particular article into a different state or thing.’93 The Court in Re Bilski 
was of the view that it is embodiment in a particular machine or apparatus, or 
physical transformation of subject matter, that distinguishes fundamental 
principles in the abstract from patent-eligible subject matter.94 
The ‘physicality requirement’ unveiled in Australia in Grant has been criti-
cised,95 and there was powerful dissent in the Federal Circuit’s decision in 
Re Bilski to the effect that the ‘machine-or-transformation’ test is inconsistent 
with existing Supreme Court precedent.96 However, under the current law, any 
storyline patent would need a physical element or need to cause some physical 
transformation to satisfy the ‘manner of manufacture’ test in Australia. Accord-
ingly, a storyline of itself would not be patentable. 
While it would appear that a bare storyline would not be sufficient to invoke 
patentable subject matter, there is an argument that a storyline embodied in some 
physical article of manufacture (a DVD or a book) might be. In fact, after the 
decisions in Grant and Re Bilski, there is an obvious temptation on the part of 
patent attorneys and patentees to avoid the operation of these decisions by 
adding a physical element to plot claims to give them some material form, in an 
attempt to pass an unpatentable abstract idea off as a patentable invention. 
Knight has done this in the second claim example given above, which recites a 
‘machine-readable storage medium’ encompassing a plot.97 
While the law in Australia does not provide much, if any, guidance on the 
acceptability of this strategy, United States law is more sophisticated in this 
regard. In the United States, adding ‘insignificant post-solution activity’ to 
otherwise unpatentable subject matter will not make that subject matter pat-
entable. In essence, the principle requires that the invention, being the advance 
over the prior art, be identified and extracted from any extraneous material 
contained in the description of the invention or claims that would otherwise 
 
 92 545 F 3d 943 (Fed Cir, 2008). The case was decided by a 9:3 majority (Michel CJ, Lourie, 
Schall, Bryson, Gajarsa, Linn, Dyk, Prost and Moore JJ). Bilski’s claims involved a method for 
managing the consumption risk costs of a commodity sold by a commodity provider at a fixed 
price: at 949 (Michel CJ for Michel CJ, Lourie, Schall, Bryson, Gajarsa, Linn, Dyk, Prost and 
Moore JJ). The ‘physical steps’ test was rejected: at 960–1; the appellant’s method claims were 
completely devoid of physical apparatus: at 963–4. Bilski then petitioned the United States 
Supreme Court seeking a writ of certiorari, which was granted: Bilski v Doll, 129 S Ct 2735 
(2009). The ‘machine-or-transformation’ test is a creation of the Court of Appeals for the Federal 
Circuit, rather than a mere application of the existing law: see the dissenting opinion of New-
man J in Re Bilski, 545 F 3d 943, 976 (Fed Cir, 2008); Benjamin J McEniery, ‘The Federal 
Circuit in Bilski: The Machine-or-Transformation Test’ (2009) 91 Journal of the Patent and 
Trademark Office Society 253. 
 93 Re Bilski, 545 F 3d 943, 954 (Michel CJ for Michel CJ, Lourie, Schall, Bryson, Gajarsa, Linn, 
Dyk, Prost, and Moore JJ) (Fed Cir, 2008). 
 94 Ibid 964–6. 
 95 See Ben McEniery, ‘Patents for Intangible Inventions in Australia after Grant v Commissioner of 
Patents’ (Pt 1) (2007) 13 Computer and Telecommunications Law Review 70; Ben McEniery, 
‘Patents for Intangible Inventions in Australia after Grant v Commissioner of Patents’ (Pt 2) 
(2007) 13 Computer and Telecommunications Law Review 100. 
 96 Re Bilski, 545 F 3d 943, 976 (Newman J), 998 (Mayer J), 1011 (Rader J) (Fed Cir, 2008). 
 97 See above n 85 and accompanying text. 
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confuse the reader as to the true scope of the inventor’s contribution to the state 
of the art. In Parker v Flook the United States Supreme Court said that 
[t]he notion that post-solution activity, no matter how conventional or obvious 
in itself, can transform an unpatentable principle into a patentable process ex-
alts form over substance. A competent draftsman could attach some form of 
post-solution activity to almost any mathematical formula; the Pythagorean 
theorem would not have been patentable, or partially patentable, because a pat-
ent application contained a final step indicating that the formula, when solved, 
could be usefully applied to existing surveying techniques.98 
In Diamond v Diehr the majority confirmed that ‘insignificant postsolution 
activity will not transform an unpatentable principle into a patentable process’.99 
Then Stevens J, in the minority judgment, described the ‘insignificant 
post-solution activity’ (that appeared in Parker v Flook and was referred to by 
the majority in Diamond v Diehr as ‘token’)100 as activity that ‘does not consti-
tute a part of the inventive concept that the applicants claimed to have discov-
ered.’101 
The United States Supreme Court developed this rule to combat attempts by 
patentees to disguise the fact that they had drafted unpatentable claims over all 
conceivable uses of a principle of nature or an algorithm. Patentees would often 
make an apparatus claim, limiting claims to a particular device or field of 
technology.102 The Court’s response to this strategy was to clearly delineate the 
inventive advance achieved and distinguish it from any extraneous limiting 
material the patentee has sought to introduce so as to avoid improperly approv-
ing a patent over any of the excluded categories of subject matter, even if only 
within a limited field of use. The effect is that if the particular device or field of 
technology is not integral to the invention claimed, its presence is ignored. 
Such a principle would be a necessary and sensible addition to Australian law. 
It would assist patent examiners and the public distinguish deserving inventions 
from claims made upon artful drafting that are not truly deserving of a patent 
monopoly. It would be decisive in distinguishing principles of nature and 
abstract ideas from patentable inventions, demanding that the inventive step be 
housed in something capable of practical application. It would help defend 
against artful claims that would seek to privatise unpatentable principles and 
laws of nature by simply appending a physical device to uses of those natural 
phenomena. 
Regardless of Australian law’s silence on this issue, it should be clear that any 
attempt to define the claims at issue in storyline patents in terms of storage 
 
 98 437 US 584, 590 (Stevens J for Brennan, White, Marshall, Blackmun, Powell and Stevens JJ) 
(1978). 
 99 450 US 175, 191–2 (Rehnquist J for Burger CJ, Stewart, White, Powell and Rehnquist JJ) 
(1981), citing ibid 586. 
100 Diamond v Diehr, 450 US 175, 193 (Rehnquist J for Burger CJ, Stewart, White, Powell and 
Rehnquist JJ) (1981). 
101 Ibid 215 (Stevens J for Brennan, Marshall and Blackmun JJ). 
102 See, eg, Parker v Flook, 437 US 584, 590 (Stevens J for Brennan, White, Marshall, Blackmun, 
Powell and Stevens JJ). 
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within a physical medium goes beyond the nature of the alleged invention. 
Knight’s approach of claiming storylines embodied in tangible storage media, as 
he contends, has parallels with the computer software cases that require a 
software program to be stored on some data storage medium, such as a floppy 
disk, hard disk or CD-ROM.103 The difference between storyline and computer 
software, however, is that the operation of a computer is integral to software’s 
functionality. Software algorithms or methods alone are useless; they must be 
executed on a computer to be useful and require the automation and interactivity 
that a general purpose computer can provide. Plots are different. The nature of 
the alleged advance of an ‘inventor of plots’ is wholly disconnected from 
physical form. A plot is just a sequence of ideas that steps through the major 
events in a story. Plots can be enjoyed and function without specific physical 
instantiation in a way computer software cannot. Physical instantiation of a plot 
is necessary for broad dissemination, not function; for instance, plots can be 
communicated verbally and thus enjoyed in the way that storytelling has been 
since time immemorial. Any physical instantiation that Knight might attempt to 
append to a plot is extraneous to any alleged ‘flash of genius’ of which it might 
have been born. The same cannot be said for computer programs, though, as any 
‘flash of genius’ in that field involves manipulating a general purpose computer 
in such a way as to make it produce a new functionality. 
4 Plots Fall outside the ‘Technological Arts’ 
One commentator in the United States has suggested that any alleged storyline 
invention would fail to satisfy the so-called ‘technological arts’ requirement, 
whereby courts confine the scope of patentable subject matter to the realm of 
technology, and that works of fiction, music, and ‘business methods not imple-
mented with computer technology’ would be unpatentable.104 Knight seeks to 
dismiss this suggestion by disputing the existence of any ‘technological arts’ 
requirement.105 
The so-called ‘technological arts’ requirement arguably lies in the United 
States Constitution, which authorises the United States Congress: 
To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited 
Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings 
and Discoveries …106 
It has been argued that Congress may not establish patent laws under the 
authority of this intellectual property clause that are contrary to the stated 
 
103 See, eg, Burroughs Corporation (Perkins’) Application [1974] RPC 147, 158 (Graham J); 
International Business Machines Corporation’s Application [1980] FSR 564, 572 (Whitford J); 
Re Beauregard, 53 F 3d 1583 (Fed Cir, 1995). See generally Re Alappat, 33 F 3d 1526 (Fed Cir, 
1994); International Business Machines Corporation v Commissioner of Patents (1991) 33 FCR 
218; CCOM Pty Ltd v Jiejing Pty Ltd (1994) 51 FCR 260. 
104 Note, ‘Pure Fiction: The Attempt to Patent Plot’ (2005) 19 Harvard Journal of Law and 
Technology 231, 235–41, 237 (Melissa Patterson authored the note; her name was provided by 
the editor upon request). 
105 Knight, ‘A Patently Novel Plot’, above n 1, 207–8. 
106 United States Constitution art 1 § 8 cl 8. 
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purpose of the clause, nor enact patent laws exceeding the constitutional objec-
tive.107 While there is little historical evidence of what is meant by ‘useful arts’, 
it appears that the term was intended to refer to ‘arts’ used in manufacturing 
industry and the production of goods.108 Some have suggested that the present 
day equivalent of the term ‘useful arts’ used in the United States Constitution is 
‘technological arts’.109 Accordingly, any patent law that does not promote the 
progress of the ‘useful arts’, or its equivalent, the ‘technological arts’, would be 
unconstitutional.110 
While it is recognised that the terms ‘useful arts’ and ‘technological arts’ are 
notoriously difficult to define, in the absence of a workable definition commen-
tators111 and the United States Patent and Trademark Office112 have identified at 
 
107 Graham v John Deere Co, 383 US 1, 5–6 (Clark J for Warren, Harlan, Brennan, Black, Clark, 
White, Douglas and Stewart JJ) (1966); Bonito Boats Inc v Thunder Craft Boats Inc, 489 US 
141, 146 (O’Connor J for the Court) (1989). 
108 Robert I Coulter, ‘The Field of the Statutory Useful Arts’ (Pt II) (1952) 34 Journal of the Patent 
Office Society 487, 496; Alan Durham, ‘“Useful Arts” in the Information Age’ [1999] Brigham 
Young University Law Review 1419, 1431–7; Richard H Stern, ‘Being within the Useful Arts as a 
Further Constitutional Requirement for US Patent-Eligibility’ (2009) 31 European Intellectual 
Property Review 6, 13–15. 
109 Re Musgrave, 431 F 2d 882, 893 (Rich J for Rich, Almond, Lane and Rosenstein JJ) (CCPA, 
1970). The Court in Re Musgrave cites no authority for the proposition that the ‘technological 
arts’ and ‘useful arts’ are equivalent, while Re Musgrave itself is cited as authority for the propo-
sition in subsequent opinions. See also Re Waldbaum, 457 F 2d 997, 1003 (Baldwin J for Al-
mond, Baldwin, Lane and Rao JJ) (CCPA, 1972): ‘The phrase “technological arts,” as we have 
used it, is synonymous with the phrase “useful arts” as it appears in Article I, Section 8 of the 
Constitution’. Rich J concurred: at 1003–4. Arguably the most exhaustive attempt to define 
‘useful arts’ is found in Robert I Coulter’s three part series: Robert I Coulter, ‘The Field of the 
Statutory Useful Arts’ (Pt I) (1952) 34 Journal of the Patent Office Society 417; Coulter, ‘The 
Field of the Statutory Useful Arts’ (Pt II), above n 108; Robert I Coulter, ‘The Field of the Statu-
tory Useful Arts’ (Pt III) (1952) 34 Journal of the Patent Office Society 718. See also Karl B 
Lutz, ‘Patents and Science: A Clarification of the Patent Clause of the US Constitution’ (1949) 
18 George Washington Law Review 50, 54; Durham, above n 108, 1437; John R Thomas, ‘The 
Patenting of the Liberal Professions’ (1999) 40 Boston College Law Review 1139, 1140. 
110 Graham v John Deere Co, 383 US 1, 5–6 (Clark J for Warren, Harlan, Brennan, Black, Clark, 
White, Douglas and Stewart JJ) (1966) (citations omitted): 
At the outset it must be remembered that the federal patent power stems from a specific consti-
tutional provision which authorizes the Congress ‘[t]o promote the Progress of … useful 
Arts …’ The clause is both a grant of power and a limitation. This qualified authority, unlike 
the power often exercised in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries by the English Crown, is 
limited to the promotion of advances in the ‘useful arts.’ … The Congress in the exercise of the 
patent power may not overreach the restraints imposed by the stated constitutional purpose. 
  See also Re Yuan, 188 F 2d 377, 380 (Garrett CJ for Garrett CJ, Jackson, O’Connell, Johnson and 
Worley JJ) (CCPA, 1951) (‘[i]t is interesting to note that this particular grant is the only one of 
the several powers conferred upon the Congress which is accompanied by a specific statement of 
the reason for it’); Ex parte Lundgren, 76 USPQ 2d (BNA) 1385, 1388 (Smith J) (Bd Pat App & 
Int, 2005) (designated precedential opinion); Ex parte Bilski, Appeal No 2002–2257,  
69–70 (Barrett J) (Bd Pat App & Int, 2006); Durham, above n 108, 1426; Malla Pollack, ‘The 
Multiple Unconstitutionality of Business Method Patents: Common Sense, Congressional Con-
sideration, and Constitutional History’ (2002) 28 Rutgers Computer and Technology Law Journal 
61, 118–19. 
111 See Thomas, ‘The Patenting of the Liberal Professions’, above n 109, 1140; John R Thomas, 
‘The Post-Industrial Patent System’ (1999) 10 Fordham Intellectual Property, Media & Enter-
tainment Law Journal 3, 7; Durham, above n 108, 1513; Thomas F Cotter, ‘A Burkean Perspec-
tive on Patent Eligibility’ (2007) 22 Berkeley Technology Law Journal 855, 871–2. 
112 See Ex parte Lundgren, 76 USPQ 2d (BNA) 1385, 1400–1 (Smith J) (Bd Pat App & Int, 2005) 
(designated precedential opinion); Ex parte Bilski, Appeal No 2002–2257, 19 (Barrett J) (Bd Pat 
App & Int, 2006). 
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least one characteristic that is a good indication that an alleged invention falls 
within the realm of the ‘technological arts’. That characteristic is that the alleged 
invention discloses a physical transformation or effect. 
The alternative view is that the ‘useful arts’ or ‘technological arts’ limitation 
requires that an alleged invention be limited to advances in ‘science and technol-
ogy’ if it is to be patentable.113 This view, however, has not found favour with the 
Federal Court of Australia, which rejected it in Grant.114 Nevertheless, it should 
not be dismissed out of hand as there is no guarantee that the High Court of 
Australia would concur with the Federal Court on this point. The question must 
be regarded as open as it is possible that the High Court might regard this 
limitation, broadly construed, as being consistent with the objectives of the 
patent system and adopt it as good law. 
Despite Australia not having a constitutional useful arts limitation or an ex-
press limitation to this effect in the Patents Act 1990 (Cth), it is important to 
consider whether the history of case law that defines the bounds of the manner of 
manufacture test demands that an invention give some technological result or 
that the grant of a patent is limited to technological innovation.115 The applicabil-
ity of this approach for use in Australia is particularly interesting given that the 
Federal Court in Grant has already given implicit support for a technological arts 
requirement (although it did not consider the issue in any depth).116 Whether 
such an approach exists under Australian law to limit the scope of patentability to 
innovations that disclose a physical element or disclose scientific or technologi-
cal innovation remains to be seen. 
What can be said of the ‘manner of manufacture’ test, as interpreted by the 
High Court to date, is that it requires that an invention be of an ‘industrial or 
commercial or trading character’.117 However, as that expression has not been 
elaborated on in the case law following the NRDC decision, not much can be 
said about what this test means or how it is to be applied other than that a 
common-sense interpretation of the individual terms used should be taken. An 
attempt to patent a plot might be seen as falling outside the ‘technological arts’ 
for failure to employ some physical means or might simply be written off as 
 
113 See, eg, Re Bilski, 545 F 3d 943, 998 (Mayer J) (Fed Cir, 2008); Re Grant [2004] APO 11 
(Unreported, Deputy Commissioner Herald, 26 May 2004) [25]; Re Peter Szabo & Associates 
Pty Ltd (2005) 66 IPR 370, 377 (Deputy Commissioner Herald); William van Caenegem, ‘The 
Technicality Requirement, Patent Scope and Patentable Subject Matter in Australia’ (2002) 13 
Australian Intellectual Property Journal 41. 
114 (2006) 154 FCR 62, 71 (Heerey, Kiefel and Bennett JJ): ‘We think that to erect a requirement 
that an alleged invention be within the area of science and technology would be to risk the very 
kind of rigidity which the High Court warned against.’ 
115 van Caenegem, above n 113, 51–2. In this article van Caenegem asserts that NRDC and 
associated case law discloses a technicality requirement. 
116 (2006) 154 FCR 62, 68 (Heerey, Kiefel and Bennett JJ), where, while referring to the decision of 
Heerey J in Welcome Real-Time SA v Catuity Inc (2001) 113 FCR 110, the Full Court said that 
‘[h]is Honour drew a distinction between a technological innovation which is patentable and a 
business innovation which is not.’ 
117 NRDC (1959) 102 CLR 252, 275 (Dixon CJ, Kitto and Windeyer JJ), citing Re Lenard’s 
Application (1954) 71 RPC 190, 192 (Lloyd-Jacob J). Lloyd-Jacob J also equated the word 
‘vendible’ with things of ‘commercial value’ in Re Elton and Leda Chemicals Ltd’s Application 
[1957] RPC 267, 269. 
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failing to conform to an ‘industrial’, ‘scientific’ or ‘technological’ character by 
virtue of being concerned exclusively with the ‘fine arts’. 
5 Plots Are Therefore Not Patentable Subject Matter 
Storylines are not patentable subject matter as they fall within the ‘fine arts’ 
rather than the ‘useful arts’. As such they are clearly excluded subject matter 
according to the test set out by the High Court in the NRDC decision. Secondly, 
storylines are mere abstract ideas, not reduced to a specific and useful practical 
application, and therefore are not an artificially created state of affairs. Further, it 
is arguable that storylines are not within the ‘technological arts’ and not of an 
‘industrial or commercial or trading character’. 
The lack of physicality in the nature of the advance claimed is also indicative 
of it not being patentable. Even if it were later found that Grant had been 
incorrectly decided, close examination of the claims would confirm them to be 
unpatentable for the reasons discussed above.118 Storylines cannot be clothed in 
false garments of physicality, either in Australia or the United States, so as to be 
passed off as patentable subject matter. 
C  Novelty and Inventive Step 
In Australia, a patent will only be granted for an invention that is novel.119 This 
means that the invention must be new in the sense that it has not been revealed to 
the public either through publication in a document or use in public. The novelty 
of each claim in a patent application is assessed against the ‘prior art base’, 
which comprises publicly available ‘prior art information’ as it existed at the 
‘priority date’ of the relevant patent claim.120 The prior art base includes infor-
mation that is made publicly available in a document or a related series of 
documents, or through doing an act or a related series of acts, as well as informa-
tion contained in a published patent application that has an earlier priority date 
than the application under examination.121 Where an invention is disclosed in 
more than one document, or by more than one act, the documents or acts will be 
considered together only if the relationship between them is such that a person 
skilled in the relevant art would treat them as a single source of information.122 
Where an invention is not novel when compared with the prior art, it is said to 
have been anticipated by that prior art. The prior art information must disclose all 
the essential integers of the invention in order for the invention at issue to lack 
novelty.123 The test for determining whether an invention lacks novelty is the 
‘reverse infringement’ test, set out in Meyers Taylor Pty Ltd v Vicarr Indus-
tries Ltd by Aickin J: ‘The basic test for anticipation or want of novelty is the 
same as that for infringement and generally one can properly ask oneself whether 
 
118 See above nn 86–93 and accompanying text. 
119 Patents Act 1990 (Cth) s 18(1)(b)(i). 
120 Patents Act 1990 (Cth) s 18(1), sch 1. 
121 Patents Act 1990 (Cth) s 7, sch 1. 
122 Patents Act 1990 (Cth) s 7(1)(b). 
123 Meyers Taylor Pty Ltd v Vicarr Industries Ltd (1977) 137 CLR 228, 235 (Aickin J). 
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the alleged anticipation would, if the patent were valid, constitute an infringe-
ment’.124 
Infringement of a claim occurs where ‘each and every one of the essential 
integers’ of that claim have been taken.125 In other words, if a citation discloses 
all the features of a claim, the claim will lack novelty. If the citation does not 
disclose all the features of the claim, the claim will still lack novelty provided the 
citation discloses all the essential features of the claim. Therefore, if an essential 
feature is not disclosed in the citation, the claim is novel. 
Patent protection will be granted in Australia only for inventions that involve 
an ‘inventive step’ (in the case of an application for a standard patent), or an 
‘innovative step’ (in the case of an application for an innovation patent). Inven-
tive step is defined in s 7 of the Patents Act 1990 (Cth) and requires a determina-
tion of whether an invention would have been obvious to ‘a person skilled in the 
relevant art’. This assessment is made in light of the ‘common general knowl-
edge’ as it existed in Australia, being the patent area, before the priority date of 
the claim.126 It may also take into consideration prior art information before the 
priority date that a person skilled in the art could reasonably be expected to have 
ascertained, understood and regarded as relevant.127 
Critics of Knight’s premise, that it is possible to create a new and unique plot, 
have argued that in reality there are no new stories, just variations of old tales 
and themes that have been used many times before.128 It has been said that there 
are but a finite and remarkably small number of plots in existence. If you write a 
story about a character, there are only so many things that can happen. While 
estimates of the number of distinct plots vary, examples are found in Georges 
Polti’s The Thirty-Six Dramatic Situations (1917) and Christopher Booker’s The 
Seven Basic Plots: Why We Tell Stories (2004). The Thirty-Six Dramatic Situa-
tions is a descriptive list which was created to categorise every dramatic situation 
that might occur in a story or performance. Similarly, The Seven Basic Plots 
details what Booker regards as the seven plots upon which all literature is 
built.129 
Thus it is said that the art of storytelling is one of retelling.130 Of course, that 
all fiction involves a retelling of other stories does not mean that the literary 
world is full of rampant copyright infringement.131 As Knight has demonstrated, 
it is possible to take the essence of another story’s plot without infringing 
 
124 Ibid (citations omitted). 
125 Rodi & Wienenberger AG v Henry Showell Ltd [1969] RPC 367, 391 (Lord Upjohn). 
126 Patents Act 1990 (Cth) s 7(2) (in relation to an ‘inventive step’); see also ss 7(4)–(5) (in relation 
to an ‘innovative step’). 
127 Patents Act 1990 (Cth) s 7(3). 
128 Patterson, above n 104, 231–2. 
129 Booker describes his seven plots as very broad themes, such as ‘overcoming the monster’ (which 
includes Beowulf, Jaws, Little Red Riding Hood, and various Bond films), ‘rags to riches’ (which 
includes Cinderella, The Ugly Duckling, and David Copperfield), and ‘voyage and return’ (which 
includes Robinson Crusoe, Alice’s Adventures in Wonderland, and The Time Machine): Christo-
pher Booker, The Seven Basic Plots: Why We Tell Stories (2004) 1, 21–2, 25, 38, 52, 88, 90, 92. 
130 Patterson, above n 104, 231. 
131 Jessica Litman, ‘The Public Domain’ (1990) 39 Emory Law Journal 965, 966–7. 
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copyright.132 All that is suggested is that, while there is ample scope to create 
new tales by adapting existing general themes, there really are no new plots. 
Assuming this to be correct, it would not be possible to create a novel and 
inventive plot. 
Thus, the likelihood, it seems, is that there will always be some piece of prior 
art that will anticipate a new and supposedly inventive plot. Minor variations on 
a theme may generate many varied storylines but would remain referable to a 
core story and therefore be likely to fail for lack of either novelty or inventive-
ness. Likewise, an amalgamation of different plot ideas in a hitherto untried 
manner is likely to be treated as though anticipated by a single source of infor-
mation. 
Some have sought to show, in a practical way, that Knight’s storyline patent 
applications lack novelty and inventiveness, by identifying instances in which 
the claims he has made to particular plots have been anticipated by popular 
movies and television programs.133 
D  Utility and the Incomplete Nature of the Invention 
An inventor must disclose the invention in the patent specification in sufficient 
detail and with sufficient clarity as to allow a person skilled in the relevant art to 
make or carry out the invention.134 A complete specification must ‘describe the 
invention fully, including the best method known to the applicant for performing 
the invention’.135 This is known as the ‘sufficiency’ requirement. The patent 
claim must also be ‘clear and succinct and fairly based on the matter described in 
the specification.’136 This is known as the ‘fair basis’ requirement. The require-
ment in s 18, that an invention be ‘useful’,137 ties in closely with what must be 
disclosed in the patent application. Section 18 requires that the patent must 
produce the results that are promised by the specification; that is, the invention 
must work or operate as promised. It does not require that an invention be useful 
 
132 See Knight, ‘A Potentially New IP’, above n 2, 874–5, citing US Patent Application 
20050244804 (filed 28 November 2003). 
133 Ben Manevitz, ‘What’s the Story with Storyline Patents — An Argument against the Allowance 
of Proposed Storyline Patents and for the Rejection of Currently Pending Storyline Patent Appli-
cations’ (2006) 24 Cardozo Arts and Entertainment Law Journal 717, 732–6; Greg Aharonian, 
‘Patenting Movies and Music?’ (2005) 27(7) Entertainment Law Reporter 4, 4. The specific 
claims to particular plots Knight has made can be found in the United States patent applications 
set out at above n 1. 
134 See above nn 61–2. 
135 Patents Act 1990 (Cth) s 40(2)(a). 
136 Patents Act 1990 (Cth) s 40(3). 
137 Patents Act 1990 (Cth) ss 18(1)(c), (1A)(c). Usefulness is not an express requirement for 
examination of a standard Australian patent application. Therefore, the Commissioner of Patents 
does not have to be satisfied that an invention is useful under s 18(1)(c) before accepting a patent 
application: s 49(1). For innovation patents, s 18(1A)(c) is not a ground for revocation: 
s 101B(2). Usefulness is a ground for revocation of a standard patent under s 138(3)(b), but is 
not a ground upon which a patent may be opposed and is not referred to on re-examination. 
     
314 Melbourne University Law Review [Vol 33 
 
     
in the sense that it is worthwhile or commercially practical, only that if a 
particular result is claimed, it must be achievable.138 
Compliance with this requirement is difficult given the incomplete and abstract 
nature of storylines. Patent protection is granted in return for an enabling 
disclosure of an invention, not for vague intimations of general ideas that may or 
may not be workable. Storyline patents teach only how to reproduce the plot 
disclosed. They leave a significant amount of work to be done to transform the 
plot outline of a story into a story proper, such as: developing characters; 
describing people, physical structures and events; creating dialogue; and 
revealing the plot at an appropriate pace. These are not outcomes that would 
flow naturally from having possession of a patented plot, as the patent specifica-
tion would not demonstrate how a skilled reader might be instructed to tell the 
story outlined so as to enable a finished product to be created. As was said in 
Brenner v Manson, ‘a patent is not a hunting license. It is not a reward for the 
search, but compensation for its successful conclusion.’139 As such, the claims 
lack utility, for without reduction of an idea to practice there can be no certainty 
that the idea actually works, and there would appear to be no quid pro quo 
between the patentee of a storyline patent and the public that would justify the 
award of monopoly rights. Patterson also notes that, were patents granted to 
individuals incapable of transforming a plot into a complete and coherent story 
with characters, dialogue and prose, ‘it would lead to the nonsensical result that 
the inventor could not execute the very process over which he claims a monop-
oly’,140 which, in the absence of a compulsory licence, would potentially deny 
the public access to use the entire plot for the duration of the patent. 
IV  PO L I C Y:  SH O U L D  STO RY L I N E S  BE  PAT E N TA B L E? 
The purpose of patent law is to encourage people to invent and commercialise 
new products and processes by giving them an incentive to do so.141 It is the 
potential economic rewards to be reaped during the patent term that are the carrot 
that induces the effort, time, expenditure and other resources to be directed into 
 
138 Advanced Building Systems Pty Ltd v Ramset Fasteners (Aust) Pty Ltd (1998) 194 CLR 171, 187 
(Brennan CJ, Gaudron, McHugh and Gummow JJ); Abbott Laboratories v Corbridge Group Pty 
Ltd [No 2] [2001] FCA 810 (Unreported, Gyles J, 29 June 2001) [22]. Note that art 17.9.1 of the 
Australia–United States Free Trade Agreement, signed 18 May 2004, [2005] ATS 1 (entered into 
force 1 January 2005), defines ‘useful’ as meaning ‘of industrial application.’ This definition is 
quite problematic as it differs from the current case law. 
139 383 US 519, 536 (Fortas J for Warren, Fortas, Harlan, Brennan, Black, Stewart, Clark, White and 
Douglas JJ) (1966). 
140 Patterson, above n 104, 242. 
141 Subcommittee on Patents, Trademarks and Copyrights, US Senate Committee on the Judiciary 
(prepared by Fritz Machlup), An Economic Review of the Patent System (1958) 33. See generally 
Joseph A Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy (2nd ed, 1942) chs VII–IX;  
Staniforth Ricketson, The Law of Intellectual Property (1984) 7; Stanley M Besen and Leo J 
Raskind, ‘An Introduction to the Law and Economics of Intellectual Property’ (1991) 5(1) Jour-
nal of Economic Perspectives 3, 5; Leo J Raskind, ‘The State Street Bank Decision: The Bad 
Business of Unlimited Patent Protection for Methods of Doing Business’ (1999) 10 Fordham 
Intellectual Property, Media and Entertainment Law Journal 61, 67. 
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innovation. The consideration for such a grant is that the inventor discloses the 
invention.142 
The reason for providing an incentive to innovate is that there is a link between 
innovation and standards of living and prosperity. Innovation is the creation of 
new and improved products and processes which are the product of the mind’s 
inventive and creative activity. Innovation is considered essential to a country’s 
economic growth and competitiveness in overseas markets and to its economic 
prosperity and its people’s standard of living.143 
James Boyle warned of the dangers of passively allowing the ‘second enclo-
sure movement’, which is the movement to enclose the intellectual commons 
with strong intellectual property protection, to take place.144 This warning was 
made in the knowledge that innovation is a cumulative process. Most creative 
and inventive output is inspired by, and an improvement on, existing technolo-
gies. The ideas encompassed in one person’s invention serve as the basis of 
another person’s improvement.145 In this regard, it must be remembered that 
patent laws are not just concerned with the privatisation of new inventions. 
Protection of the commons remains one of the goals of patent law.146 
Knight argues that, as storylines are valuable to someone, they should be 
recognised as a species of property and afforded protection. He says there are 
storylines that are ‘so inventive, so surprising, and so profound that any expres-
sion of [them] is valuable’.147 His argument is that ‘public policy dictates a need 
 
142 William D Nordhaus, Invention, Growth, and Welfare: A Theoretical Treatment of Technological 
Change (1969) ch 1; Mark A Lemley, ‘Ex Ante versus Ex Post Justifications for Intellectual 
Property’ (2004) 71 University of Chicago Law Review 129, 129–30; Richard Gilbert and Carl 
Shapiro, ‘Optimal Patent Length and Breadth’ (1990) 21 RAND Journal of Economics 106, 106. 
It should be recognised that the patent incentive does not solely relate to providing an incentive 
for innovation, but has now moved to providing an incentive for invention and the commerciali-
sation of new products: Subcommittee on Patents, Trademarks and Copyrights, above n 141, 
36–8. 
143 United States Federal Trade Commission, To Promote Innovation: The Proper Balance of 
Competition and Patent Law and Policy (2003) 1, citing Federal Reserve Board Vice Chairman 
Roger W Ferguson Jr, ‘Patent Policy in a Broader Context’ (Speech delivered at the 2003 Finan-
cial Markets Conference of the Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta, Sea Island, Georgia, 5 April 
2003): ‘innovation benefits consumers through the development of new and improved goods, 
services, and processes. An economy’s capacity for invention and innovation helps drive its 
economic growth and the degree to which standards of living increase.’ 
144 James Boyle, ‘The Second Enclosure Movement and the Construction of the Public Domain’ 
(2003) 66(1–2) Law and Contemporary Problems 33, 37. For opinions on the importance of 
maintaining the public domain when new intellectual property interests are recognised, see 
generally David Lange, ‘Recognizing the Public Domain’ (1981) 44(4) Law and Contemporary 
Problems 147; Litman, above n 131; Yochai Benkler, ‘Free as the Air to Common Use: First 
Amendment Constraints on Enclosure of the Public Domain’ (1999) 74 New York University Law 
Review 354. 
145 Suzanne Scotchmer, ‘Standing on the Shoulders of Giants: Cumulative Research and the Patent 
Law’ (1991) 5(1) Journal of Economic Perspectives 29, 29–30. 
146 Graham v John Deere Co, 383 US 1, 5–6 (Clark J for Warren, Harlan, Brennan, Black, Clark, 
White, Douglas and Stewart JJ) (1966); Gottschalk v Benson, 409 US 63, 67 (Douglas J for 
Burger CJ, Douglas, Brennan, White, Marshall and Rehnquist JJ) (1972). See generally Thomas, 
‘The Patenting of the Liberal Professions’, above n 109; Thomas, ‘The Post-Industrial Patent 
System’, above n 111; John R Thomas, ‘Liberty and Property in the Patent Law’ (2002) 39 Hous-
ton Law Review 569. 
147 Knight, ‘A Potentially New IP’ above n 2, 871 (emphasis in original). 
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for legal protection, in the form of intellectual property rights, for the entire 
work — expression and storyline.’148 The essence of the argument is consistent 
with the view that anything of value should be recognised as a species of 
property and afforded protection as such.149 
Knight’s plan would produce results contrary to his stated aims to create inno-
vation in the market for stories. While new story ideas are undoubtedly of some 
value, there are a number of arguments that explain why they are not the sort of 
innovation the patent system is designed to encourage. Allowing storyline 
patents would suppress artistic creation by erecting barriers to entry for those 
who would write, reduce the number of plots available to be made into new 
stories, unfairly restrict public access to concepts and material that ought to 
reside in the public domain, and consequently retard cultural development.150 
The difficulty with patent law is that infringement can be inadvertent, uninten-
tional and done without knowledge or intent. If its scope is allowed to branch out 
into literature and film, writers would, at best, need to engage in due diligence to 
ensure they avoid infringing plot patents and the threat of litigation and financial 
ruin or, worse, under a cloud of uncertainty they would abandon their talents and 
deprive us of their works. New writers without deep pockets or not linked with 
established publishing companies would be deterred from entering the market or 
even distributing their work free of charge. If it were not for the dual require-
ments of novelty and inventiveness, storyline patents would have the effect of 
maintaining the status quo in the publishing and writing industries by removing a 
layer of competition in the market, leading to more repetition and less innovation 
in story plots. In particular, storyline patents would pose a big threat to new 
writers by imposing tall barriers to entry. Had the idea of patenting storylines 
been around in the 1850s, perhaps Charles Dickens would not have written great 
pieces of literature such as Bleak House, Great Expectations or A Tale of Two 
Cities. 
Knight assumes that retelling the same plots with new characters, settings, 
perspectives and themes is something patent law should restrict. In essence, he is 
calling for radical creativity in the literary and cinematic worlds rather than 
incremental improvement upon the existing art. This argument displays a 
misunderstanding of the nature of the creative process inherent in the ‘fine arts’ 
which, whether it be in literature, painting, sculpture, music or any other field, 
necessarily requires re-use, adaptation and an ability to build upon the general 
themes found in existing works. It is about taking inspiration from the world 
around us. Further, the value in artistic works lies in the nature of their expres-
sion. That is why copyright law is applied to material form in the way that it is 
and why patent law exists outside the fine arts. The fine arts would be much less 
exotic, as would our lives, if entrepreneurs could reserve all forms of artistic 
 
148 Ibid 860–1 (emphasis in original). 
149 See, eg, Maurer, above n 34. 
150 See Litman, above n 131, 969: ‘When individual authors claim that they are entitled to incentives 
that would impoverish the milieu in which other authors must also work, we must guard against 
protecting authors at the expense of the enterprise of authorship.’ 
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expression in respect of a stated idea for their own use, potentially allowing 
untalented hacks to prevent authors exercising their craft or gouge them with 
licence fees. 
Further, patent law does not make provision for parodies, satire and social 
commentary. Parodies need to mimic an original work to convey a criticism of 
that work. It seems unlikely that a humorous take on a patented mechanical 
device would give rise to a merchantable product. However, if a parody or satire 
were to reproduce the patented steps of a storyline method claim, there would be 
no defence to an allegation of infringement. 
As Patterson has noted,151 the failure to prevent the publication of Alice Ran-
dall’s The Wind Done Gone (2001) is an example of the intellectual property 
system vanquishing an attempt to prevent an author appropriating an entire plot 
for the purpose of social commentary. Randall retold the story of Gone With the 
Wind by Margaret Mitchell from the view of the plantation master’s illegitimate 
daughter (a slave of mixed race) as a challenge to the very conservative perspec-
tives and judgments on display in that book.152 The Eleventh Circuit reversed a 
preliminary injunction preventing publication, which had been granted after the 
Mitchell estate argued the work to be a copyright infringement.153 If such works 
were not to see the light of day for fear of patent infringement, it would be a 
tragedy and it would concrete the acceptance of established perspectives and 
values. 
The proposed storyline patents would also have the extreme effect of cordon-
ing a plot off from public discussion, thus affecting freedom of speech. Such 
patents might be disallowed in the United States by operation of the guarantee of 
freedom of speech enshrined in the First Amendment,154 but no such restriction 
exists in Australia. 
Finally, the point must be made that patents are not necessary to provide incen-
tives for the creation of new stories. Wonderful, inspirational, action-packed and 
touching stories are plentiful, but are not necessarily on DVD. All they need is to 
be found. My mother used to chastise me as a child, saying that only boring 
people feel bored, whereas interesting people find interesting things to do. The 
fact that Knight claims to feel boredom with Hollywood film scripts possibly 
indicates only that it is time for him to branch out and enjoy other forms of 
entertainment. 
For these reasons, as a matter of policy, the incursion of storylines into the 
sphere of patentable subject matter should not be allowed. 
 
151 Patterson, above n 104, 248–9. 
152 SunTrust Bank v Houghton Mifflin Co, 268 F 3d 1257, 1270 (Birch J for Birch, Marcus and 
Wood JJ) (11th Cir, 2001). The Court stated that ‘based upon our analysis of the fair use factors 
we find, at this juncture, [The Wind Done Gone] is entitled to a fair-use defense’: at 1276. The 
Court also agreed (at 1267) that The Wind Done Gone ‘is largely an encapsulation of [Gone With 
the Wind that] exploits its copyrighted characters, story lines, and settings as the palette for the 
new story’, quoting SunTrust Bank v Houghton Mifflin Co, 136 F Supp 2d 1357, 1367 
(Pannell DJ) (ND Ga, 2001). 
153 SunTrust Bank v Houghton Mifflin Co, 268 F 3d 1257, 1259 (Birch J for Birch, Marcus and 
Wood JJ) (11th Cir, 2001). 
154 See generally Patterson, above n 104, 244–9. 
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V  CO N C L U S I O N 
There are three reasons why storylines will not form part of the patent land-
scape in Australia. These are: they are not patentable subject matter; they cannot 
either be novel or sufficiently inventive to be distinguished from existing 
literature; and they lack utility, as they cannot be sufficiently described so as to 
be reproduced by a person skilled in the art to create a useful product. 
Contrary to what Knight maintains, the fact that his claimed methods are for 
producing entertainment is a decisive factor rendering them unpatentable subject 
matter, in Australia at least. The High Court of Australia was clear in NRDC that 
matter falling within the fine arts be excluded from patentability. Had Knight’s 
claims been for a new technological device that was of utility in producing 
entertainment, perhaps a different conclusion would be possible, but a claim to 
literature or other entertainment itself will not hold water. 
Knight’s storyline claims must be seen for what they are: impermissible at-
tempts to privatise unpatentable ideas that are elements of the fine arts and have 
not been reduced to a specific and useful purpose. They are not inventions. These 
storylines are not so much useful products in the sense of a complete novel ready 
for publication but are instead ideas for stories, which are by their nature 
incomplete and abstract and leave much work and independent decision-making 
to be done. 
As a matter of policy, storylines are not a desirable subject matter for pat-
entability. Unlike the traditional types of invention protected by the patent 
system, such as new types of mechanical equipment, new electrical devices or 
new agricultural methods, plot patents are likely to stifle, rather than enhance, 
innovation. To allow patents of this type would seriously and detrimentally 
impinge upon our ability to use the raw tools accumulated in the storehouse of 
human knowledge that is the public domain and would thereby be detrimental to 
human cultural advancement. Possibly the only benefit of allowing storyline 
patents would be that they would support the employment of literature and 
movie buffs to act as consultants to writers and lawyers providing services in due 
diligence and litigation. 
Ultimately, the attempt to patent plot reveals a misunderstanding of the nature 
of creative works and the creative process: they necessarily require re-use, 
adaptation and an ability to build upon general themes in existing works. Indeed, 
Knight’s arguments are premised around the contention that borrowing from, 
adapting, reinterpreting and retelling plots with different characters, different 
perspectives, different language or different themes is an end our intellectual 
property laws should discourage. The re-use of themes over the ages that 
permeates literature shows this contention to be wrong. 
The attempt to patent plot also reveals a misunderstanding of the objects of 
patent law. It is an attempt to expand the bounds of patentable subject to infringe 
upon ideas that rightly exist within the public domain. Protection of the com-
mons remains one of the goals of intellectual property law. In the same way that 
copyright does not protect mere ideas, nor does patent law and nor should it. 
Knight’s argument that patent law should supplement copyright is flawed for this 
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reason. If a writer is able to conceive of new plots but unable to write them, that 
is an unfortunate situation but not one that the law ought to be contorted to 
accommodate. 
